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Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornell, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 35, 90 P.3d 978 (June 7,
2004)1
INSURANCE LAW – COVERAGE
Summary
Fire Insurance Exchange (“FIE”) appealed an order granting the respondents
summary judgment that concluded FIE’s homeowner’s liability coverage extended to
negligent supervision resulting in intentional acts and child molestation.
Outcome/Disposition
Reversed and remanded with instructions. The court reversed the Eighth Judicial
District Court’s decision by determining that FIE’s policy did not cover an “insured’s
alleged negligent supervision of an adult son who commits statutory sexual seduction.”2
Thus, the court remanded the matter and instructed the district court to enter summary
judgment in favor of FIE.
Factual and Procedural History
While living with his parents, nineteen-year-old Milton Hernandez had sexual
intercourse with the twelve-year-old daughter of the respondents Ron and Dawn Cornell.
Subsequently, the state prosecuted Hernandez and he pleaded guilty to four counts of
statutory sexual seduction. At the time of the incident, a homeowner’s liability policy
issued by FIE insured Hernandez’ parents, Gonzalo and Maria Villalobos. The Cornells
filed a civil suit against Hernandez and the Villalobos.
The portion of the suit relating to the Villalobos alleged they had negligently
supervised Hernandez. The Villalobos turned the defense of the suit over to FIE because
they believed their homeowner’s policy covered the claim. FIE filed a declaratory relief
action against the Cornells, Villalobos and Hernandez. The declaration sought judicial
recognition that the policy issued by FIE to the Villalobos did not cover statutory sexual
seduction. Hernandez and the Villalobos failed to respond to FIE’s complaint and the
district court entered a default judgment in favor of FIE.3 However, the court ruled that
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The liability policy at issue in the case contained clauses excluding both intentional acts and child
molestation. The court pointed out that the policy:
does not cover “bodily injury or property damage . . . is either . . .
caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured; or . . . results
from any occurrence caused by an intentional act of any insured where
the results are reasonable foreseeable.” Second, and more specifically,
the policy excludes:
[A]ctual or alleged injury or
medical expenses caused by or
arising out of the actual, alleged, or
threatened molestation of a child by
2

the judgment did not bar the Cornells from seeking any other proceeds available to them
under the policy.
After FIE and the Cornells both filed motions for summary judgment, the court
granted summary judgment to the Cornells. The court held that the insurance policy
covered the Villalobos as negligent coinsureds. It further determined the policy did not
cover Hernandez. FIE appealed.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the insurance policy did not cover the
Villalobos as negligent coinsureds. Although the policy required FIE to indemnify and
defend the Villalobos for damages caused by an “occurrence,” the court reasoned that a
homeowner’s negligent supervision which results in sexual molestation is not an
“occurrence.”4 The court pointed out that the policy defined “‘occurrence’ as an accident
resulting in bodily injury.”5 As previously stated by the court, an accident is “‘a
happening that is not expected, foreseen, or intended.’”6 Because the damages to the
victim arose from an intentional act, the court reasoned the damages could not be an
occurrence.7 Additionally, the court stated the Villalobos’ “failure to prevent the sexual
seduction [was] not an ‘accident’ . . . ”8
Finally, the court found the child molestation exclusion clause in the policy
applied to actions on the part of the insured that result in child molestation. Thus, the
Cornells’ argument that the policy only excluded damages caused by the actor and not
those caused by the negligence of the insured failed. As a result, the court reversed the
district court and instructed the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of FIE.
Conclusion
This decision has implications beyond an insurer’s liability in suits arising out of
child molestation. For instance, the court’s narrow characterization of “occurrence” as an
accident resulting in bodily injury could prevent insureds from seeking indemnification
for damages resulting in mental distress. Moreover, in cases where an insurance policy
includes an exclusion clause for any intentional act, the court’s finding regarding the
child molestation clause could bar recovery under the policy for any negligent
supervision claims. Hence, the court’s decision will result in less insureds receiving
indemnification from their insurance companies.

. . . any insured . . . . Molestation
includes but is not limited to any
act of sexual misconduct, sexual
molestation, or physical or mental
abuse of a minor.
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